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GENETIC SCREENING AND INSURANCE: TOO
VALUABLE AN UNDERWRITING TOOL TO BE
BANNED FROM THE SYSTEM
Naomi Obinatat
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-eight years ago, James Watson and Francis Crick dis-
covered the structure of DNA.' Since then, scientists have been
probing our genetic code in the attempt to shed light on the biologi-
cal mysteries of life, death, and disease.2 Today, it is not uncom-
mon to read a news headline reporting the identification of a specific
gene and its association with a particular disease.3 In March and
April, 1990 the news press reported the discoveries of genes associ-
ated with colon cancer and alcoholism.4
One area of major development resulting from these advances
in biotechnology has been genetic screening. Genetic screening is a
procedure whereby the DNA in blood cells is analyzed for informa-
tion about a person's genetic history.5 The screening procedure
provides invaluable information about a person's health, including
whether or not that person, or their offspring, is predisposed to cer-
tain diseases.6 This determination can provide a warning about an
individual's future state of health.7 It can also provide relief from
Copyright © 1992 by Naomi Obinata.
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University School of Law.
1. The human genome is a compilation of genes in the chromosomes carried in each
cell that makes up a human being. "Chromosome" refers to DNA strands which contain
genes. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes for a total of 46. A "gene" is a strand of DNA
containing instructions for the production of specific required proteins for the proper function
of a cell activity. "DNA" is the molecule that contains the basic architecture of the proteins
and other chemicals required for life. John Carey et.al., The Genetic Age, BUSINESS WEEK,




5. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of
Modern Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J 665, 686 (1990). See also Robert Wachbroit, Making the
Grade: Testing for Human Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 583, 586 (1988).
6. See Carey et al., supra note 1.
7. See Joseph M. Miller, Comment, Genetic Testing and Insurance Classification: Na-
tional Action Can Prevent Discrimination Based on the "Luck of the Genetic Draw", 93 DIcK-
INSON L. REv. 729, 742 (1989).
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worry if the individual believes he or she may have inherited a pos-
sibly debilitating disease.' Since the procedure can give information
about genetically-based illness, it can also be used for risk assess-
ment of a person's future health risk. Since private insurance rates
are based on risk assessments, health insurers would have a genuine
interest in using genetic screening information.9
Two potential problems could arise if insurers are allowed to
utilize genetic screening. The first is a societal issue: society may
disapprove of its use because of the inherent "genetic discrimina-
tion" that would result.10 The second potential problem is a rise in
the number of "uninsurables" - i..e., those who pose such high
health risks that they would most likely be denied insurance.11
The discrimination concern reflects society's general distaste
for drawing lines between groups of people on the basis of factors
they cannot control. This is evident in the problems that have arisen
from statistical risk groupings based on race and sex.12 In keeping
with the policy of eradicating discrimination based on these vari-
ables, legislatures have passed laws disallowing the use of race, and
in some jurisdictions, sex, in insurance underwriting.13
Classifications of persons by risk are, however, a necessary part
of insurance.14 When restrictions are placed on underwriting, an
inherent unfairness results in the setting of premium rates. When
persons do not have to pay premiums according to their risk poten-
tial, then those in the higher risk group can pay lower rates than
their risk would require, but at the expense of the lower risk groups
8. See Carey et al., supra note 1, which gives a story about a 63-year-old man whose
father and brother died of Huntington's disease. Huntington's disease is a lethal disease that
is manifested by the degeneration of the mind and body. He leaped at the opportunity to
learn his own fate by a simple blood test which indicated whether he carried the flawed gene.
The results of the test were negative: he did not carry the flawed gene.
9. See Prediction and Prejudice, CONSUMER REPORTS, July 1990, at 483.
10. See Miller, supra note 7.
11. Critics of genetic screening fear that such information would naturally give rise to a
greater number of persons who cannot afford to purchase insurance. See Prediction and Prej-
udice, supra note 9. However, such a result is a mere prediction, and the result in actuality
may be the opposite. For example, an individual shown to be at risk of contracting Hunting-
ton's disease based on the individual's family history may be automatically denied insurance,
even though there is a 50-50 chance the person would never contract the disease. Through
genetic screening the individual can determine if he or she has inherited the defective gene. If
the individual has not inherited the gene, there is no risk of contracting Huntington's disease,
and the insurance risk is thus removed. See Judy Berifein, Genetic Testing: Healthcare Trap,
Los ANGELES TIMES, April 30, 1990, at B 2.
12. See KEN ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 76 (1986).
13. See infra notes 52 and 102.
14. See Joseph S. Gerber, The Economic and Actuarial Aspects of Selection and Classifi.
cation, 10 FORUM 1205, 1207 (1975).
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who must subsidize them.15 Restricting insurance underwriting
may actually result in more harm to society than benefit. 16
The fact that the use of genetic screening information may be
pursued by insurers gives rise to controversy. One commentator
proposes that genetic screening be banned from use by insurers alto-
gether. 7 Such a proposal would probably be received favorably by
society in general; no one wants to be discriminated against based
on their genetic makeup. However, the benefits that could be
gained by allowing insurers to use genetic screening would likely
make such a measure too drastic. If used responsibly, genetic
screening could improve insurance. With increased accuracy in as-
sessing a person's risk, premium rates could be set more fairly, thus
benefitting both insurers and insureds. This comment contends that
insurers should be allowed to use genetic information as part of the
underwriting process.1 Genetic screening is too important a tech-
nology to be banned.
This comment examines the moral reasons forwarded by the
critics opposing the procedure. By working within the rationales of
moral unfairness and efficiency, the comment will show that genetic
screening not only is a valuable tool for insurers because of the im-
provements to business it could provide, but in addition, can be
used to solve the problem of discrimination based upon the tradi-
tional "suspect" classifications.19
In private insurance, where competition and economics neces-
sitate setting premiums according to risk, it is an unavoidable real-
ity that some individuals who are in high risk groups will not be
able to pay for private insurance. 3 In response to the problem of
insuring these "uninsurables," some states have enacted risk-pool-
ing legislation.21 California is not one of these states. This com-
ment suggests that as part of the implementation of genetic
15. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
16. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN L. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 8.4(2), at 957-58
(1988).
17. See Miller, supra note 7, 93 DICKINSON L. REV. at 745.
18. It is in individual insurance that underwriting involves an evaluation of personal
characteristics that could impact a given insured's risk. Group insurance, on the other hand,
involves evaluation of relevant characteristics of a group of insureds rather than individuals.
See Karen A. Clifford and Russel P. luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS
Related Testing, I00 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1808-1809 (1987). Because discrimination based
on individual characteristics is at issue here, this comment will be discussing insurance in the
context of individual insurance only.
19. See infra notes 100-116 and accompanying text.
20. Clifford and luculano, supra note 18, at 1822.
21. See infra note 140.
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screening by insurers, California also enact risk pooling legislation
into the Insurance Code.22
II. GENETIC SCREENING, INSURANCE AND DISCRIMINATION
A. What is genetic screening and what is the fear?
Genetic screening is used to obtain information2s as to whether
a person has a propensity for developing an ailment brought on by
defective genes.24 Genetic screening is accomplished by probing the
DNA present in blood cells to determine the presence of certain
genetic markers associated with various genetic diseases. 25
The procedure is not a new concept; it has been in existence for
nearly 30 years.26 The first tests made were for phenylketonuria2 7,
sickle-cell anemia, and Tay-Sachs disease.2" More recently, genes
associated with Huntington's chorea, cystic fibrosis, colon cancer
and the link to emphysema have been uncovered. 29 As the tech-
niques for gene mapping have advanced, the rate at which specific
genes associated with genetic ailments have been discovered has in-
creased dramatically.30
The fear in allowing insurers to use genetic screening arises
from the belief that a new "genetic discrimination" will result.3s
However, the notion of differentiating individuals according to their
risk categories is an important and basic part of running an insur-
ance business.32 Discrimination is necessary to maintain fairness in
premium rates. 3 If insurers are not allowed to classify according to
risk, then there would be a single uniform premium. To account for
the mixing of risks, the premium would have to become higher than
22. "Without further safeguards [against unfair genetic discrimination by insurers] pre-
dictive testing could push additional millions into the ranks of the uninsured." supra note 9.
23. A related topic is "DNA fingerprinting" for gathering criminal evidence against a
suspect. See Sally E. Renskers, Comment, Trial by Certainty: Implications of Genetic "DNA"
Fingerprints", 39 EMORY L.J. 329 (1990).
24. See Carey et. al., supra note 1.
25. See Miller, supra note 7, at 731. See also Robert Wachbroit, Making the Grade:
Testing for Human Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 583 (1988).
26. See Capron, supra note 5, at 686.
27. Id. Phenylketonuria is a condition found in some newborns which could lead to
mental retardation.
28. Capron, supra note 5, at 686.
29. See Carey et.al., supra note 1.
30. Annas, Impact of Gene Maps on Law and Society, TRIAL, July 1990, at 42. For
more information on genetic mapping, see White and Lalouel, Chromosome Mapping with
DNA Markers, SCIENTIFIc AMERICAN, Feb. 1988, at 40.
31. See Prediction and Prejudice, supra note 9.




it otherwise would be if the lower risk groups paid according to
their risk. 4 The result would be a lack of equity among the in-
sureds."5 Premium rates could eventually become so expensive that
people no longer purchase insurance. Insurers could face insol-
vency. 6 In light of the importance of insurance to society,37 such a
result would be highly unfortunate.
B. A brief overview of risk classification in insurance.
The selection and classification of risks is a basic and funda-
mental concept in insurance.
An insurance company has the responsibility to treat all its poli-
cyholders fairly by establishing premiums at a level consistent
with the risk represented by each individual policyholder. As
one observer has noted, "[b]asic to the concept of providing in-
surance to persons of different ages, sexes .... occupations and
health histories... [is] the right of the insurer to create classifica-
tions to recognize the many differences which exist among
individuals.
38
Equity among insureds is maintained when each insured can
contribute to the common insurance fund according to the quality
of the insured's risk. Equity cannot exist if one person pays less
than his or her share, causing rates to increase for other persons in
the group to keep the common fund solvent and able to pay
claims.39 Thus, "[plremium rates must be high enough to assure
permanent financial security for the company and, at the same time,
low enough to enable the company to be competitive."'
Obviously, insurers compete for customers. But fundamen-
tally, insurers compete against the insureds themselves.41 If insur-
ance is too expensive, people will not purchase it. Instead, people
will invest in savings or other arrangements as a means for insuring
against the risk of future loss.42
The courts and Congressional intent manifest the basic view
that competition in insurance "best serves our economic and social
34. Id. at 1209-1210.
35. Clifford and Iuculano, supra note 18, at 1817.
36. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12.
37. See Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One
Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 852 (1986).
38. Clifford and Iuculano, supra note 18, at 1808 (footnote omitted).
39. Gerber, supra note 14, at 1207.
40. Id. at 1212.
41. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 67.
42. Id.
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aims." 3 "'It is the opinion of Congress that competitive rates on a
sound financial basis are in the public interest.'""
Unbridled governmental intrusion into insurance business af-
fairs would be harmful to the industry because of its hand-tying
effect. The tension between the desire to protect the public from
unfair treatment and the dangers that restrictions place on the sta-
bility of the industry was elucidated in German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Kansas.a" There the United States Supreme Court recognized the
need for some regulation: "[T]he business of insurance so far affects
the public welfare as to invoke and require governmental regula-
tion." 6 Regarding the regulation of actuarial practices, however,
the court said:
The contracts of insurance may be said to be interdependent.
They cannot be regarded singly, or isolatedly, and the effect of
their relation is to create a fund of assurance and credit, the com-
panies becoming the depositories of the money of the insured,
possessing great power thereby and charged with great responsi-
bility. How necessary their solvency is, is manifest. a7
The policy regarding insurance can thus be reduced to the fol-
lowing: although the government should regulate the industry due
to its importance to society, at the same time, insurers must be able
to run the business in such a way as to maintain solvency.
C. The quandary: rate discrimination is socially
disagreeable, but insurers must discriminate to
maintain solvency.
To efficiently classify risks, it makes business sense to use sta-
tistical risk predictor variables such as race or sex.48 These classifi-
cations, however, tend to raise social, moral and legal concerns
because of their "suspect" nature.49 Race discrimination has tradi-
tionally been considered intolerable.5 0 In the interest of eradicating
race discrimination on all fronts, many states have passed laws ban-
43. Gerber, supra note 14, at 1216.
44. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, cited in, Gerber, supra note 14,
at 1214.
45. 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
46. Id. at 412.
47. Id. at 414.
48. ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 76.
49. Id. at 93.
50. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
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ning the use of race as an insurance underwriting variable."1 Cali-
fornia is among these states.5 2
Prohibitions on sex classifications have been less uniformly ap-
plied. This nonuniformity probably stems from the fact that sex has
not traditionally been deemed "suspect" or "invidious" as has been
the case for race discrimination. 3 For example, sex classification
cannot be used by employers 4 but can be used by the military.5
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to com-
ment on sex classification used by employers in comparison with
insurers in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart 6
and Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.5 7 These cases arose
from the employers' usage of statistics, directly or through insurers,
to determine the amount of retirement pay for its employees. 8 In
both cases, the Court held that the employers' practices of differen-
tiating between male and female employee retirement pay rates vio-
lated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 9 With regard to such
practices by insurers, the Manhart Court recognized their validity:
"We do not suggest that the statute [Civil Rights Act] was intended
to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries."'  The Court
refrained from stating in Norris that insurers ought to be similarly
restricted from using sex-based mortality tables even though the in-
surance companies had "done the dirty deed" of using sex-based
calculations to administer the fund. Rather, the Court acquiesced
in the insurers' practice.61
51. Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries,
19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 349, 364-66 (1986).
52. Id.
53. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982).
55. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 83.
56. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
57. 463 U.S. 1073 (1982).
58. In Manhart, the female employees complained about the employer's use of sex-
based mortality tables to calculate the amount to be deducted from male and female employ-
ees' salaries. Since statistics showed women live longer than men, women would be drawing
retirement benefits for a longer period of time. As a result, the female employees suffered a
greater deduction from their paychecks than their male counterparts. 435 U.S. at 704-05.
Likewise, in Norris the female employees received less retirement pay per month than
their male counterparts as a result of actuarial calculations made by insurance companies
selected by the employer to administer the 'retirement fund. 463 U.S. at 1076-77.
59. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717, and Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074-75.
60. 435 U.S. at 717.
61. "[O]ur judgment will in no way preclude any insurance company from offering an-
nuity benefits that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated actuarial tables. All that is at
issue in this case is an employment practice... " 463 U.S. 1073, 1087-88 n.17 (emphasis in
original).
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In response to the Manhart and Norris decisions, some states
passed sex-based underwriting restrictions.62 California, however,
did not make an all-out prohibitionan against using sex-based differ-
entials.63 The California legislature instead added a paragraph stat-
ing that sex-based differentials are not required for insurance
contracts provided through employers in compliance with Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act."4
Other recent court decisions have recognized insurers' right to
classify. In Life Insurance Association of Massachusetts. v. Commis-
sioner of Insurance, 65 the court refused to allow the insurance com-
missioner to restrict underwriting practices for individuals who
tested positive for the AIDS-HIV antibody. The court's refusal is
made even more remarkable in light of the fact that such a refusal
meant impossibly high premiums for those infected.6
The basic principle underlying statutes governing underwriting
practices is that insurers have the right to classify risks and to
elect not to insure risks if the discrimination is fair .... The
intended result of the process is that persons of substantially the
same risk will be grouped together, paying the same premiums,
and will not be subsidizing insureds who present a significantly
greater hazard.67
In another case, Physicians Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Denenberg,6" the insurer attempted to make premium rates "equita-
ble" by charging the same premium across the board, for all of its
coverages and therefore, risks. The court struck down this practice
as unfair discrimination.
The term "discrimination" used in Life Insurance Association
and Denenberg connoted differing meanings. In Life Insurance As-
sociation, it was discrimination where HIV carriers were risk-classi-
fled differently from non-HIV carriers, yet in Denenberg, it was
discrimination when the same premium was charged irrespective of
62. Wortham, supra note 52.
63. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(f) (West Supp. 1991).
64. The legislative history states in part: "In order for life insurers to continue to offer
insured benefits on an individual basis for persons affected by this decision in California, it is
necessary that this act take effect immediately."
65. 530 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1988).
66. "AIDS-HIV antibody" refers to the antibodies that are formed when a person has
been exposed to the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus. A blood test, known as ELISA, is
used to screen for the antibody's presence. Its accuracy is nearly 100%. See Clifford and
luculano, supra note 18, at 1812.
67. Life Ins. Ass'n. of Mass., 530 N.E.2d at 171.
68. 327 A.2d 415 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974). The complaint in this case was that equal
rather than unequal rates were unfair.
[Vol. 8
GENETIC SCREENING
risk. However, if one looks past this potentially confusing point,
both cases make it clear that classification by insurers promotes
fairness.
Although courts have shown some tendency to favor the insur-
ers in underwriting challenges, discrimination issues thrive in both
commentary and legislatures.69 In a review of current legislative
bills and perspectives on the handling of the discrimination prob-
lem, one author suggests that insurers refrain from classifying risk
groups according to variables that cannot be controlled.70
In the context of "genetic discrimination", one proposal is that
genetic screening use by insurers is morally wrong and should be
banned. 71 It is said that four potential problems warrant the ban-
ning of genetic screening, these being: employment discrimination if
employers use genetic screening data,7 2 the concern that genetic
screening information would lead to additional coverage exclusions
as pre-existing conditions, 73 the psychological effects upon a person
whose test results show a propensity for contracting a fatal or
debilitating disease74 and the breach of confidentiality over a per-
son's genetic test results.75 In other words, notwithstanding the
value of genetic screening to insurers and insureds, the technology
should not be used because of its potential moral consequences.
Moral arguments can be powerful because they appeal to
human compassion. But, as will be shown, moral arguments,
viewed on a pragmatic level, can be weak. The weakness of these
moral arguments balanced against the substantial benefits that will
be derived from genetic screening, compels the conclusion that ge-
netic screening is too valuable an underwriting tool to be banned.
D. The weakness of moral arguments for banning genetic
screening by insurers.
1. The employment discrimination concern.
The thought of employment discrimination based on genetics is
troubling. Many commentaries have discussed this very issue.7 6
69. See Wortham, supra note 52.
70. Id.
71. See Miller, supra note 7, at 751-752.
72. Id. at 744.
73. Id. at 744.
74. Id. at 742.
75. Id.
76. See Mary Bassett Stanford, Note, Genetic Testing in Employment: Employee Pro-
tection or Threat?, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1187 (1981); Edith F. Cantner, Employment
Discrimination Implications of Genetic Screening in the Workplace Under Title VII and the
1992]
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Though the legal issue of how to handle genetic discrimination in
the workplace is beyond the scope of this comment, some sugges-
tions are given below.
The Civil Rights Act7 7 seems to provide limited if any protec-
tion from genetic discrimination.7" Should the need arise, however,
genetic discrimination could be added to the Act. Employment dis-
crimination based on one's genes can be as objectionable as discrim-
ination based on sex. As Justice Stevens once described sex
discrimination, "It is objectionable because it is based on an acci-
dent of birth."79
What employers can or cannot do with genetic data, however,
should not affect the question of whether insurers should be able to
use it in risk assessment. The desire to maintain a separation be-
tween insurers and employers' actuarial practices was clear from
the dicta ofManhart8 ° and Norris."1 Such a separation is important
because unlike other businesses, classification of persons based on
their risk is an integral and necessary part of the insurance business.
Thus, even if employers' use of actuarial tables is prohibited, the
insurers should be left alone.
2. Pre-existing conditions.
Health insurance policies typically exclude from coverage pre-
existing health conditions.82 It has been argued that genetic tests
would allow insurers to more liberally exclude coverages as pre-ex-
isting conditions.8" This argument is nonsensical. Genetic screen-
ing provides knowledge of a risk. Even if the occurence of illness is
90% probable, 4 it is only a risk. Furthermore, even if a person is
shown to be at risk, the future course of events cannot be fully
known. The individual may be able to avoid the risk by altering his
or her lifestyle, 5 or may simply see relatively mild affects of the
Rehabilitation Act, 10 AMER. J. L. & MED. 323 (1984); William D. Matthewman, Title VII
and Genetic Testing: Can Your Genes Screen You out of a Job?, 27 How. L.J. 1185 (1984);
Katherine Brokaw, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers' Liability, 23 COLUM.
J. L. & Soc. PROB. 317 (1990).
77. See supra note 54.
78. See Cantner, supra note 77, at 336.
79. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976).
80. 435 U.S. 702.
81. 463 U.S. 1073.
82. ROBERT IRWIN MEHR et.al., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 443 (8th ed. 1985).
83. Miller, supra note 7, at 744.
84. See Carey et al., supra note 1, in reference to the gene for Huntington's disease.
85. Provided that the risk is of a type that can be controlled to an extent, such as a heart
attack. See authorities cited infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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disease.6 A risk, therefore, cannot be equated with a presently ex-
isting condition-in-fact. Accordingly, a health risk evidenced by ge-
netic screening should not be deemed a "pre-existing condition."
3. The ethical hazard concern.
The ethical hazard concern refers to the potential psychologi-
cal harm that would result for the person who decides 7 to undergo
genetic screening and is found to possess a life-threatening genetic
trait.88 Some people may incur a negative psychological impact;
others may not. One woman who was found to have a 90% chance
of contracting Huntington's Chorea had a seemingly healthy atti-
tude. She said that she decided to take the test because: "Ignorance
is really stupid. The more you know, the better off you are." 9
Some people who learn of their disorder will need psychological
support.90 But there are ways to help. One comment suggests
mandatory counseling, by placing those who test positive for an in-
curable disorder into a support group.91
The ethical hazard concern is emotionally appealing, but it is
an independent issue. The technology is available and people will
take advantage of it,92 regardless of whether insurers use it. Those
who receive positive test results for a terrible disease may suffer se-
vere emotional distress.93 The ethical hazard exists by virtue of the
technology itself. Banning its use by insurers will not solve the ethi-
cal hazard problem. Such a ban would only suffice to create a new
hazard: other insureds would have to bear the financial costs of
subsidizing those at higher risk merely because of their potential for
self-inflicted psychological harm.
4. Confidentiality concerns.
The issue of genetic screening and confidentiality has been
86. "A specific disorder may manifest itself severely in some people and mildly in
others." Berlfein, supra note 11, at B2.
87. This comment addresses only questions related to voluntary genetic screening.
Questions related to forced genetic screening are leyond the scope of this comment.
88. Miller, supra note 7, at 754. The comment defends the theory as follows: "When
persons are told they will develop an incurable disease, there is risk of suicide, drug abuse, job
loss, and other problems."
89. See Carey et al., supra note I.
90. See Cheryl L. Becker, Comment, Legal Implications of the G-8 Huntington's Ge-
netic Disease Marker, 39 CASE WESTERN L. REv. 273, 282 (1988).
91. Id.
92. See Carey et al., supra note I.
93. See Becker, supra note 91, at 282. Individuals who receive a positive test result
from a Huntington's Chorea genetic screening can run a high suicide risk.
1992]
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raised previously in other articles.94 Insurers are sensitive to the
issue. They are aware that care must be taken in obtaining screen-
ing information so as not to deter individuals from obtaining genetic
screens, or, more fundamentally, to donate blood.95
In the event that confidentiality is breached, there are stan-
dards in place, or at the least have been recommended, 96 to remedy
resulting harm. For example, in any medical treatment there must
be confidentiality between patient and physician.97 If this confiden-
tiality is'breached, remedies in contract, defamation and invasion of
privacy are available, as well as statutory remedies.9" These stan-
dards can be applied,99 after there has been an allegation of a
breach, and after genetic screening has taken place. The existence
of potential legal remedies in the event of a confidentiality breach
fizzles the proposition that confidentiality problems require the ban-
ning of the use of genetic screening.
III. THE HIDDEN BENEFIT OF GENETIC SCREENING
A. Fairness and other problems in using certain statistical
variables.
The general fairness of classification of risks beyond the in-
sured's control has been questioned."°° It has been proposed that
classification on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin be banned from the underwriting process for all lines of in-
surance.101 Some states have banned sex classification in automo-
bile insurance underwriting and coverage, and one state extends the
ban to all lines of personal insurance.102
The use of such uncontrollable Variables by insurers have
94. See George Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster My-
thology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629 (1990); Annas, supra note 30; White and Lalouel, supra note 30;
Wachbroit, supra note 25; Janet A. Kobrin, Comment, Medical Privacy Issue: Confidentiality
of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1283 (1983); Ethical Eye on Insurers' Genetic
Tests, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 15, 1990, at 9.
95. On the subject of AIDS, the American Council of Life Insurance has stated:" 'Our
position is to not try to obtain from blood banks, plasma centers, or alternative testing sites
the results of blood tests given by them, since to do so might discourage people from donating
blood.'" Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis. Underwriting or Overreaching? 100
HARV. L. RV. 1782, 1803 (1987).
96. See Becker, supra note 91, at 295.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 295-98, for a discussion of legal issues arising from genetic screening for
Huntington's disease.
100. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 89.
101. Wortham, supra note 52.
102. Id. at 366. The states passing legislation as to automobile insurance are: Hawaii,
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raised not only moral but legal tensions. To remain attractive to
insurance purchasers while maintaining financial security, insurers
strive to provide coverage to insureds according to the expected
risks and therefore, costs.103 In doing so, insurers classify risks." 4
These classifications are based on certain statistically correlated risk
factors because the costs of gathering the data required for further
risk refinement may exceed the financial benefit that would be de-
rived from the greater accuracy.10 5 As a result, such suspect classi-
fications as race or sex are used. 106
There is another problem with the use of such classifications, in
that they can be inaccurate and thereby force subsidization.'0 7 For
example, sex may correlate with driver accident rates and thus be
used as a risk factor for automobile liability insurance.108 The rea-
son this factor is used is that the cost of gathering sex data may be
substantially lower than determining an individual's habits or char-
acter.109 Risk assessment based in statistical correlations leads to a
degree of coincidental grouping. Some, perhaps many individuals
who are in the higher risk group because of their sex, have excellent
driving habits which in reality would make them a very low risk. 110
But since they are placed in the higher risk category due to their
sex, they pay a higher premium than their actual risk would re-
quire. Essentially, these individuals subsidize those in the same
group who are a higher risk. 1'
For health and life insurance, genetic screening serves as the
most reliable way to assess an individual's health risk."12 The inac-
curacy of this method lies only in the probability that is assessed.113
With better underwriting reliability, the degree of subsidization
within a health risk group can be minimized." 4 Instead of indirect
statistical correlations that can lead to coincidental risk grouping,
direct information about the health of an individual would be used.
Michigan, Massachusetts, and North Carolina. Montana has banned sex classification from
all lines of personal insurance. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1989).
103. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 77.
104. See Gerber, supra note 14, at 1207.
105. See ABRAHAM supra note 12, at 69.
106. Ia at 92-95.
107. I at 83.
108. Id. at 69.
109. Id. at 85.
110. Id. at 71, 74-75.
111. Id. at 83.
112. See Carey et al., supra note 1.
113. Id.
114. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 79-80, 83.
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There would be a cost in gathering the genetic screening data, t" 5
and it may still be less expensive to use the present classification
scheme. However, "[tihe more reliable the variables on which
classes are based, the more worthwhile the level of refinement, since
it will represent classification on the basis of actual expected loss
99116
In the long run, the benefits derived from genetic screening
may lead insurers to replace statistical correlations altogether for
underwriting health and life insurance policies. Replacement of
current statistical variables would allow suspect variables to be
erased from the underwriting process. No longer would insureds be
grouped artificially based on sex or race; instead, real predictive fac-
tors would be used to assess risk. This is the hidden benefit of ge-
netic screening.
B. Present legislation for ensuring fairness and equity in the
use of genetic screening.
The insurance industry has long been subject to legislation re-
quiring fairness for its insureds."' California has already ac-
counted for potential difficulties in the use of genetic screening,118
but the restriction is narrowly drawn. The California insurance
Code prohibits the insurer from refusing to issue, sell, or renew any
life or health insurance because the person has been shown to carry
a gene which may be transferred to the person's offspring, but
otherwise would cause no adverse effects to the carrier.1 9 The code
115. A cost summary is tabulated in Market for DNA Probe Tests for Genetic Diseases,
GENETIC TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Nov. 1986, at 6. The approximate price for DNA probe
tests based on single genes is $30 per test. This amount is subject to change depending on the
disease probe.
116. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 79.
117. See Clifford and luculano, supra note 18, at 1809.
118. CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West's Supp. 1990).
119. Id. The provision states:
(a) No insurance company licensed in this state shall refuse to issue or sell or
renew any policy of life or disability insurance after appropriate application
solely by reason of the fact that the person to be insured carries a gene which
may, under some circumstances, be associated with disability in that person's
offspring, but which causes no adverse affects on the carrier. Such genes shall
include, but not be limited to, Tay-Sachs trait, sickle cell trait, thalassemia
trait, and X-linked hemophilia A. No such policy issued and delivered in this
state to any association, corporation, firm, fund, individual, group, order, or-
ganization, society, or trust subject to the supervision of the commissioner shall
demand or require a higher premium rate or charge by reason of the fact that
the person to be insured carries such traits than is at that time required of any
other association, corporation, firm, fund, individual, group, order, organiza-
tion, society, or trust in an otherwise identical classification, nor shall any asso-
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does not state that insurers cannot take into account genetic infor-
mation of the individual in its underwriting. Further, the code does
not restrict underwriting for the person who is shown to have a
propensity for contracting a disease.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF UNINSURABLES
A. Uninsurables as a casualty of private insurance.
A consequence of a goal to distribute insurance premiums
fairly is the denial of insurance to some individuals.12 Insurers,
acting alone, simply cannot afford the financial burden of covering a
person at very high risk. It is estimated that the health care cost for
the "174,000 AIDS patients projected to be alive during the year
1991 will be between $8 billion and $16 billion." 121
The type of burden that the insurer would face because of a
ban on screening for the AIDS-HIV antibody can be illustrated as
follows: 100 AIDS-infected individuals purchase life insurance cov-
erage of $100,000 for an annual premium of $200, on the basis of an
assumption that these people pose average risk for lack of other in-
formation. At the end of 7 years, 20 of these insureds die, after
having paid $1,400 in premiums. The insurer must pay out $2 mil-
lion at this time. The return on the premium investment is 1,329%
in this case. It is difficult to see how this can be afforded. 122  If
insurers were forced to accomodate purchasers who are a very high
risk, some companies would surely go out of business. 12 3 To avoid
insolvency, insurers could charge a uniformly high premium. This
ciation, corporation, firm, fund, group, individual, order, organization, society,
or trust make or require any rebate, discrimination, or discount upon the
amount to be paid or the service to be rendered on such policy because the
person to be insured carries such traits.
(b) No insurance company licensed in this state shall insert in a policy of life
or disability insurance any condition, nor make any stipulation, whereby the
person insured who carries a gene which may, under some circumstances, be
associated with disability in that person's offspring, but which causes no ad-
verse effects on the carrier, including, but not limited to, Tay-Sachs trait, sickle
cell trait, thalassemia trait, and X-linked hemophilia A, shall bind himself, his
heirs, executors, administrators, or assignees to accept any sum or service less
than the full value or amount of the policy in case of a claim accruing thereon
other than such as are imposed upon other persons in similar cases and any
such stipulation or condition so made or inserted shall be void.
120. Clifford and luculano, supra note 18, at 1821.
121. See Roger A. Formisano, The Crowded Health Care Agenda, BEST'S REVIEW
LIFE-HEALTH INSURANcE EDrrION, Jan. 1989, at 54.
122. See Barbara J. Lauzenheiser, Socialized Insurance: The Rising Tide; Challenge to
Risk Classification, BEST'S REvIEw - LIFE-HEALTH INSURANCE EDrrIoN, Jan. 1989, at 22.
123. Clifford and luculano, supra note 18, at 1822.
1992]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURN4L
route would be immediately unfavorable to the many insureds who
must become subsidizers of a few at extremely high risk. People
would lose their incentive to purchase insurance because of the
cost. 124
B. The ability to prevent disease and save oh insurance.
Knowledge of one's future health provides an opportunity to
take preventive measures to avoid the onset of a given health condi-
tion. If the insured takes these preventive measures, an insurance
discount can be given.
A present example of this is in automobile insurance. Since it
has been found, statistically, that non-smokers and non-drinkers
create fewer risks, rates for such insureds are reduced accord-
ingly.125 In addition, awards are given for those who take preven-
tive measures to reduce their risk. Thus, an insured can receive a
30% discount on the medical coverage portion of auto insurance if
he or she drives a car with an air bag.126 Such classifications com-
paratively burden those designated as higher risk (no air bag, smok-
ers, drinkers). The rates, however, are fair because each insured
pays proportionately to the degree of risk. Moreover, those at
higher risk have an opportunity to alter their lifestyles to place
themselves in the lower risk category.
These principles can be applied to risks found from genetic
screening. If, for example, a person was screened for susceptibility
to contracting heart disease, the insured could take measures in diet
and exercises to extend his or her life127 and thereby reduce the risk
category, or receive a discount from the higher risk premium. For
those who cannot take measures to control their risk, and as a result
cannot obtain insurance, there are alternative coverages that should
be made available by risk-pooling, as will be discussed below.128
The future brings greater possibilities for preventing the onset
of genetic-based disease. At the same time that genes for various
diseases are discovered, new treatments for genetic ailments are be-
ing developed. For example, in the case of an early-life emphy-
sema,129 scientists have found a genetic defect that is at the root of
124. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 67.
125. Gerber, supra note 14, at 1212.
126. Id. at 1208.
127. See Carey et al., supra note 1.
128. See statutes cited infra notes 139 to 149 and accompanying text.
129. See Carey et al., supra note 1. Emphysema is a breathing disorder which is caused




of the condition in 95% of the victims.13° The researchers devel-
oped a therapeutic technique for delivering a normal gene into the
body of the victim, so that the gene could cause the cells to function
properly, and halt the furtherance of damage to the lungs. 31  Gene
therapy 132 opens tremendous possibilities for the actual curing of
serious genetic disorders. 33 If these cures are successful, insurance
rates could be lowered (because the insurance risk of the cured indi-
vidual goes down), which could result in a decrease in the number
of "uninsurables."1 34
Treatments for some genetic disorders are on the horizon. Yet,
some individuals whose risks are too high will still face the status of
being "uninsurable."' 135  To enable insurance coverage for these
"uninsurable" risks, several states have enacted risk pooling legisla-
tion.136 In California, various parts of the insurance code prohibit
insurers from refusing to sell insurance to individuals of a particular
risk.' 37 Nothing in the legislature, however, addresses the particu-
lar problem of insuring the "uninsurables."
V. A SUGGESTION FOR RISK POOLING LEGISLATION IN
CALIFORNIA
In suggesting that California adopt risk pooling legislation, this
comment does not purport to hold that state risk pooling legislation
is the best or only solution to the problem. 13  The fact that risk
pooling legislation has been adopted in 13 states, 139 however, indi-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. For a discussion on the gene therapy technique, see Ida M. Verma, Gene Therapy,
ScIENTisc AMERICAN, Nov. 1990, at 68.
133. Two human gene therapy experiments, one for treating skin cancer, the other treat-
ing children who lack ADA Cadenosine deaminase, a key immune-system enzyme, have been
approved. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Green Light: Scientists Stand on the Brink of Performing
Gene Therapy, TIME, August 13, 1990, at 61.
134. The application of gene therapy in humans is in the beginning stages. See Elmer-
DeWitt, supra note 133.
135. See Prediction and Prejudice, supra note 8.
136. See statutes infra note 140.
137. CAL. INS. CODE § 10144 (West's Supp. 1990) - Physically or mentally impaired
persons; CAL INS. CODE § 10145 (West's Supp. 1990) - Blindness or partial blindness.
138. See Clifford and Iuculano, supra note 18, at 1822-1824 for a discussion of the risk
pooling option.
139. The sections are: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 38-371 - 38-381 (1987 & Supp. 1991);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.648 - 627.6498 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73 para 1301 - 1314
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-10-1 - 27-8-10-8 (Bums 1986 & Supp.
1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 514E.1 - 514E.11 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 62E.01 - 62E.55 (1986 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1501 - 33-22-
1522 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 441.4209 - 44-4230 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
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cates that such legislation can be considered in California at least as
a temporary means for protecting those highest risk individuals.
The current risk pooling legislations are similar in form and
requirements from state to state. The uniformity of the laws makes
it apparent that risk pooling legislation is well-defined. California
could adopt the provisions of the other states. The following will be
a brief but general description of current risk pooling legislation..
The discussion will reflect the uniformity of the law from state to
state, rather than serve as a comparative analysis. Presented in the
Appendix is an example, in outline form, of risk pooling legislation
that could be adopted in California, based on an incorporation of
the main provisions contained in current legislation.
The purpose of risk pooling is to provide health insurance for
those state residents who otherwise cannot receive insurance. 140
The risk pool is established as a nonprofit corporate entity which
issues health insurance to persons who are eligible. The eligibility
requirement is satisfied if a person is a state resident and has proof
of rejection by at least one insurer for health reasons. The non-
profit entity is comprised of a board of directors. 141 The number of
directors varies, but most states require nine. The composition of
the board is to represent a variety of groups pertinent to assuring a
fair and reasonable implementation of the legislative intent. 142 An
example of the required composition is taken from the Utah legisla-
tion:143 health insurance industry, health maintenance organization,
physician, hospital, person who is qualified for coverage under the
pool, the person's spouse or parent, the general public, and employ-
ers. II The insurance commissioner and the director or the depart-
ment of health are also to sit on the board. The board is appointed
by the governor or insurance commissioner.
The board is given general powers granted to insurance compa-
nies of the respective states. These powers include entering con-
tracts, setting rates, issuing policies of insurance, the ability to sue
or be sued, and electing an administering insurer.1 45
The health care expenses covered under the pool are the cus-
§§ 26.1-08-01 - 26.1-08-13 (1989 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-39-103 - 56-39-123
(1989 & Supp. 1990); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3.77 (West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN.




143. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-29-104 (1991). This board contains 11 members.




tomary and reasonable charges for medically necessary health care
services which exceed the amount of deductible. These would in-
clude major medical expense coverage, prescription drugs, profes-
sional services for the diagnosis or treatment of injuries or disease,
radiation therapy, anesthetics, X rays and laboratory tests, and
services for diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous
disorders. 146
The insurance pool premium rates are ultimately determined
by the board and may not be unreasonable. The premiums of the
five highest volume insurers offering a comparable coverage as the
pool are used as a standard from which the applicant will be
charged a certain percentage above this rate."a7 Usually, the rates
are 135% to 200% of the standard. One state provides a discount
schedule for those uninsurables who also cannot afford to pay the
premiums set by the risk pool. 4 '
This comment has incorporated the risk pooling legislations of
the other states into an outline. 149 The reason for doing this is two-
fold. First, it enables visualization of the general provisions of cur-
rent risk pooling legislation. Second, it provides a framework for
risk pooling legislation in California.
VI. CONCLUSION
Genetic screening is a valuable tool for underwriting health in-
surance. The technique allows for a more accurate assessment of
insurance risks and as a result, makes setting of rates more precise,
and therefore, fair.
Opposition to insurers' use of genetic screening is based on the
moral consequences. Such a view is flawed, however, because such
moral consequences stem from the existence of the technology itself,
and not from its use in insurance. Measures can be taken to dimin-
ish the moral problems arising from the technology. Insurers, how-
ever, must be left alone.
Genetic screening could replace highly objectionable variables
such as sex in the underwriting scheme. Thus, at the same time that
rates could be set more fairly, the concern over allowing insurers to
continue to discriminate based on factors that are unlawful for
other businesses to use would be alleviated.
Whether or not insurers embrace genetic screening, the unfor-
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 519.165 (West 1990).
149. See Appendix.
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tunate situation of certain persons being deemed "uninsurable" is
an unavoidable aspect of private insurance. The law needs to ac-
comodate for the misfortunes of these few "uninsurables." Some
states have enacted risk-pooling legislation in answer to this
problem.
California currently is in the process of deciding the question
of the use of genetic screening by insurers, and is questioning how
to deal with the inevitability of "uninsurables."1 0 In light of the
value of genetic screening in insurance underwriting and the social
desirability in maintaining equity in insurance rates, California
should not prohibit the use of genetic screening. To guarantee in-
surance for those in the highest risk groups, California should con-
sider enacting risk pooling legislation.
150. Lisa M. Kreiger, Cases of Genetic Discrimination on the Rise, SAN FRANCISCO Ex-





COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE RISK POOL ACT
I. Legislative Intent
The purpose and intent of the general assembly is to
provide access to health insurance coverage to all residents
of the State of California who are considered uninsurable or
underinsured.
II. Creation of Pool
A. There is hereby established a nonprofit entity known
as the California Comprehensive Health Insurance
Risk Pool. All insurers authorized to issue health
insurance in this state and providing health plan
benefits in this state shall be members of the pool as of
the date this section is enacted.
B. There shall be established a board of directors
consisting of nine (9) members, to be selected
collectively by the governor and insurance
commissioner. The members of the board will
represent the following groups:
1. Domestic insurance industry
2. Nonprofit health care service
3. Health maintenance organization
4. Physician
5. Medical research faculty
6. Hospital administrator
7. An "uninsurable" insurance applicant
8. General public
9. MediCal
C. The board shall operate as a board of directors of any
nonprofit entity, and have a fiduciary obligation
toward the entity.
D. The board shall have the power to
1. Enter into contracts as are necessary to carry out
requirements and policies of this section.
2. Review applications of prospective insureds.
3. Sue or be sued.
4. Establish rates and coverages.
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5. Appoint technical personnel for actuarial and
underwriting processing.
6. Pool risks among members.
7. Determine all risk-sharing policies not contained
in this section.
8. Enter into any other transaction or do any other
business allowed of insurers.
III. Eligibility
A. Who is eligible
1. A person is eligible for a risk pool policy upon a
showing that the person has been rejected by two
(2) carriers of health insurance for health reasons,
including results from a genetic test.
2. No person who is currently eligible for a federally-
funded or state-funded health insurance plan will
be eligible to participate in the Risk Pool Act.
3. Any insured who is no longer in the category of
"uninsurable" is no longer eligible for assistance
under this plan.
B. Risk assessment
1. Insured's health risk will be assessed.
a. biennially, if insured is below the age of 50.
b. annually, if insured is age 50 or older.
c. annually, if insured is among the following
enumerated groups (list those ailments, found
by genetic screening or otherwise, which pose
serious health risks but can be controlled,
such as heart disease, or genetic ailment
which can be treated by gene therapy).
IV. Health Coverage under Plan
A. Expenses Covered
1. Covered expenses are the usual and customary
charges for medically necessary health care
services that exceed the deductible amounts,
including gene therapy.
2. Eligible medically necessary health care services
will be defined by the board.





Hospital stay and treatment
Prescription drugs
Professional services for the diagnosis or





V. Health Insurance Pool Premium
A. Rates for coverages issued
B. Premium rates must take ir
may not be unreasonable.
ito consideration the extra
morbidity and administration expenses, if any, for
risks insured in the asociation.
C. A standard pool rate shall be determined based on the
average rate of the five (5) largest carriers of benefits
comparable to the coverage offered by the pool.
D. The rates for a given classification may not be more
than 175% of the standard pool rate.
E. If the rate approved by the board exceeds the
applicant's ability to pay, the board shall grant a
discount at a rate to be set by the board.
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